THE LONG TRAIL OF SIBEL EDMONDS AT THE FBI
by Jon Rappoport
July 14, 2004

Recently, I wrote a piece about Sibel Edmonds, the FBI translator who was fired for reporting on Bureau corruption in the area of handling investigations into terrorism.

Edmonds had run into some very dark situations where FBI terror probes had been shelved, scuttled, erased, and put into the freezer.

There were major indications that Edmonds, in her FBI job, had come up against a pervasive culture of Cover Your Ass practices, aimed at shielding and protecting FBI employees AFTER very serious screw-ups had occurred.

Edmonds went to court to get her job back, a job she says she lost purely because she blew the whistle on what she had found.

At the moment, her legal efforts appear to be dead in the water.

The press is no longer interested, and a government gag order has been placed on testimony she gave before Congress. National Security, don’t you know.

Perhaps outside the range of Edmonds’ experience, but not outside the experience of others, there is this matter: is it just the screw-ups that are concealed, in order to keep people’s jobs safe; is it just that security risks are allowed to work at the FBI; or do we finally say, after many FBI incidents of corruption over a period of decades, that there is a strategy, a plan, an intent, at some high level, inside or outside the Bureau, to CREATE FAILURE, to CREATE OBFUSCATION, to CREATE A SITUATION THAT WILL ALLOW THE DOOR TO STAY OPEN FOR TERROR OPS AGAINST THE US?

Such questions are not the job of Edmonds to answer. She was a fairly low-level FBI employee. But readers of this site certainly know where I stand. One definition of a fool is a person who condones a whole pattern of lies and mistakes and covert deals without realizing that, somewhere at the top of the fog, there are people who want to paint a false picture of reality, who want to invent an enemy without, when in fact the enemy is within. The core enemy is not wearing a robe; he is wearing a well-cut business suit. He is using fronts to launch ops against whatever is left of the idea of freedom. He is using governments and government agencies to weaken nations.

I will now give you two documents. The first is a 2002 piece from CBS 60 Minutes, in which Ed Bradley had a conversation with Sibel Edmonds about her experiences at the FBI. Note, down in the interview, the name DICKERSON is mentioned and discussed. It will figure prominently in the second document, which is a letter written by Edmond’s attorney. That letter contains allegations which will build your stress load to the limit, if you are a person who wants to believe that the FBI merely makes mistakes here and there, that the FBI is basically on the correct side of things.

Even if you make a snap judgment call and say that Edmonds and her attorney must be wrong, must be way off, you would have to be without brain cells to want this matter gagged and buried and closed to further investigation.

My own interest, as I say, goes way beyond proving FBI corruption. It involves seeking out the sources of that corruption---sources which surely want more terrorism on US soil. In previous articles, I have named groups that use war and terrorism to build a de facto “globalist management structure”---the rule of the billions by the few.

In the CBS piece, also note well the MASSIVE charges leveled at the FBI by one of its own internal affairs chiefs, John Roberts. Where has all THAT gone? Down the rabbit hole, across the meadow and through the looking glass.


(CBS) This is the story of hundreds, if not thousands, of foreign language documents that the FBI neglected to translate before and after the Sept. 11 attacks because of problems in its language department - documents that detailed what the FBI heard on wiretaps and learned during interrogations of suspected terrorists.

Sibel Edmonds, a translator who worked at the FBI's language division, says the documents weren't translated because the divison was riddled with incompetence and corruption.

Edmonds was fired after reporting her concerns to FBI officials. She told her story behind closed doors to investigators in Congress and to the Justice Department. Most recently, she spoke with the commission investigating the Sept. 11 attacks.

She spoke with Correspondent Ed Bradley in October 2002.

Because she is fluent in Turkish and other Middle Eastern languages, Edmonds, a Turkish-American, was hired by the FBI soon after Sept. 11 and given top-secret security clearance to translate some of the reams of documents seized by FBI agents who have been rounding up suspected terrorists across the United States and abroad.

Edmonds says that to her amazement, from the day she started the job, she was told repeatedly by one of her supervisors that there was no urgency - that she should take longer to translate documents so that the department would appear overworked and understaffed. That way, it would receive a larger budget for the next year.

“We were told by our supervisors that this was the great opportunity for asking for increased budget and asking for more translators,” says Edmonds. “And in order to do that, don't do the work and let the documents pile up so we can show it and say that we need more translators and expand the department.”

Edmonds says that the supervisor, in an effort to slow her down, went so far as to erase completed translations from her FBI computer after she'd left work for the day.

“The next day I would come to work, turn on my computer and the work would be gone. The translation would be gone,” she says. “Then I had to start all over again and retranslate the same document. And I went to my supervisor and he said, ‘Consider it a lesson and don't talk about it to anybody else and don't mention it.’

"The lesson was don’t work, and don’t do the translations."

Edmonds put her concerns about the FBI's language department in writing to her immediate superiors and to a top official at the FBI. For months, she said she received no response. Then, she turned for help to the Justice Department's Inspector General and to Sen. Charles Grassley, whose committee, the Judiciary Committee, has direct oversight of the FBI.

“She's credible,” says Sen. Grassley. “And the reason I feel she's very credible is because people within the FBI have corroborated a lot of her story.”

The FBI has conceded that some people in the language department are unable to adequately speak English or the language they're supposed to be translating. Kevin Taskasen was assigned to Guantanamo Bay in Cuba to translate interrogations of Turkish-speaking al Qaeda members who had been captured after Sept. 11. The FBI admits that he was not fully qualified to do the job.

“He neither passed the English nor the Turkish side of the language proficiency test,” says Edmonds.

Critical shortages of experienced Middle Eastern language translators have plagued the FBI and the rest of the U.S. intelligence community for years.

Months before the first World Trade Center bombing in 1993, one of the plotters of the attack was heard on tape having a discussion in Arabic that no one at the time knew was about how to make explosives - and he had a manual that no one at the time knew was about how to blow up buildings. None of it was translated until well after the bombing, and while the FBI has hired more translators since then, officials concede that problems in the language division have hampered the country's efforts to battle terrorism.

According to congressional investigators, this may have played a role in the inability to prevent the Sept. 11 attacks. The General Accounting Office reported that the FBI had expressed concern over the thousands of hours of audiotapes and pages of written material that have not been reviewed or translated because of a lack of qualified linguists.

“If they got word today that within, in a little while, the Hoover Dam was going to be blown up, and it takes a week or two to get it translated, as was one of the problems in this department, you know, you couldn't intervene to prevent that from happening,” says Grassley.

In its rush to hire more foreign language translators after Sept. 11, the FBI admits it has had difficulty performing background checks to detect translators who may have loyalties to other governments - which could pose a threat to U.S. national security.

Take the case of Jan Dickerson, a Turkish translator who worked with Edmonds. The FBI has admitted that when Dickerson was hired the bureau didn't know that she had worked for a Turkish organization being investigated by the FBI's own counter-intelligence unit.

They also didn't know she'd had a relationship with a Turkish intelligence officer stationed in Washington who was the target of that investigation. According to Edmonds, Dickerson tried to recruit her into that organization, and insisted that Dickerson be the only one to translate the FBI's wiretaps of that Turkish official.

“She got very angry, and later she threatened me and my family's life,” says Edmonds, when she decided not to go along with the plan. “She said ‘Why would you want to place your life and your family's life in danger by translating these tapes?’”

Edmonds says that when she reviewed Dickerson's translations of those tapes, she found that Dickerson had left out information crucial to the FBI's investigation - information that Edmonds says would have revealed that the Turkish intelligence officer had spies working for him inside the U.S. State Department and at the Pentagon.

“We came across at least 17, 18 translations, communications that were extremely important for the ongoing investigations of these individuals,” says Edmonds. “She had marked it as "not important to be translated."

What kind of information did she leave out of her translation?
“Activities to obtain the United States military and intelligence secrets,” says Edmonds.

She says she complained repeatedly to her bosses about what she'd found on the wiretaps and about Dickerson's conduct, but that nobody at the FBI wanted to hear about it. Not even the assistant special agent in charge.

“He said ‘Do you realize what you are saying here in your allegations? Are you telling me that our security people are not doing their jobs? Is that what you're telling me? If you insist on this investigation, I'll make sure in no time it will turn around and become an investigation about you,’” says Edmonds.

Sibel Edmonds was fired. The FBI offered no explanation, saying in the letter only that her contract was terminated completely for the government's convenience.

But three months later, the FBI conceded that on at least two occasions, Dickerson had, in fact, left out significant information from her translations. They say it was due to a lack of experience and was not malicious.

Dickerson quit the FBI and now lives in Belgium. She declined to be interviewed, but she told The Chicago Tribune that the allegations against her are preposterous and ludicrous. Sen. Grassley says he's disturbed by what the Dickerson incident says about internal security at the FBI.

Does the Sibel Edmonds case fall into any pattern of behavior, pattern of conduct on, on the part of the FBI?

“The usual pattern,” says Sen. Grassely. “Let me tell you, first of all, the embarrassing information comes out, the FBI reaction is to sweep it under the rug, and then eventually they shoot the messenger.”

Special agent John Roberts, a chief of the FBI's Internal Affairs Department, agrees. And while he is not permitted to discuss the Edmonds case, for the last 10 years he has been investigating misconduct by FBI employees. He says he is outraged by how little is ever done about it.

“I don't know of another person in the FBI who has done the internal investigations that I have and has seen what I have, and that knows what has occurred and what has been glossed over and what has, frankly, just disappeared, just vaporized, and no one disciplined for it,” says Roberts.

Despite a pledge from FBI Director Robert Mueller to overhaul the culture of the FBI in light of 9/11, and encourage bureau employees to come forward to report wrongdoing, Roberts says that in the rare instances when employees are disciplined, it's usually low-level employees like Edmonds who get punished and not their bosses.

“I think the double standard of discipline will continue no matter who comes in, no matter who tries to change,” says Roberts. “You, you have a certain, certain group that, that will continue to protect itself. That's just how it is.”

Has he found cases since Sept. 11 where people were involved in misconduct and were not, let alone reprimanded, but were even promoted? Roberts says yes.

end of 60 Minutes piece.



And now, here is the second document:

September 19, 2002

Via Fax: (703) 604-8567

Joseph E. Schmitz
Inspector General
U.S. Department of Defense
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C.

Dear Inspector General Schmitz:

We represent Ms. Sibel Edmonds, who filed allegations regarding violations of the DOD Personnel Security Program by letter dated August 7, 2002. An inquiry into Ms. Edmonds’ allegations was opened under Hotline case number 85069.

By letter dated September 10, 2002, Colonel James N. Worth, Director, Inquiries Directorate, Office of the Inspector General, Department of the Air Force, informed Ms. Edmonds that the matter was being closed as a result of the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFSOI) having conducted a complete and thorough review of her concerns. I am writing to bring to your direct attention our concern that this matter was not thoroughly or completely investigated and that this matter was not properly handled. In addition, we ask that your office look into this matter further and investigate these very serious matters.

Ms. Edmonds alleged in her letter of August 7th that both Major Douglas Dickerson and his wife, Melek Can Dickerson,1/ have committed numerous violations of the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) Personnel Security Program. Improper contacts with foreign governments, officials or organizations by spouses of military personnel also constitute violations of the DOD Personnel Security Program. In addition, a security risk may exist when an individual’s family members may be subject to duress or other potential influence by a foreign country.

Notably, in his letter of September 10th, Col. Worth states that OSI’s investigation focused on “Major Dickerson’s relationship with the American-Turkish Council.” This statement is very troubling for a number of reasons. First, Ms. Edmonds never even mentioned the name of this organization in any of her communications with the DOD, DOD IG, Department of the Air Force IG, and AFOSI, concerning this matter. Second, Ms. Edmonds’ concerns are not limited to whatever contacts Major Dickerson might have with the American-Turkish Council. Third, this statement by Col. Worth is evidence that the AFOSI and the Air Force IG did not properly review Ms. Edmonds’ concerns in this matter. Fourth, Col. Worth’s letter characterized Ms. Edmonds’ concerns in the narrowest and most limited way which demonstrates that both the AFOSI and the Air Force IG did not appreciate the gravity and seriousness of Ms. Edmonds’ allegations in this matter.

There is no indication that either the AFOSI or the Air Force IG has investigated the Dickersons’ relationships with other organizations and individuals which would be necessary in order to conduct a complete and thorough investigation of this matter. In addition, neither Ms. Edmonds nor her counsel was requested by AFOSI or the Air Force IG to provide additional information. Without obtaining additional information from Ms. Edmonds it would be impossible for the AFOSI or the Air Force IG to obtain the detailed information regarding the identities of the organization(s)/individual(s) and the scope of their relationships to the Dickersons. In addition, there are a number of other allegations of wrongdoing that have been made (a number of which have already been substantiated) against Mrs. Dickerson, which would constitute additional violations of the DOD Personnel Security Program. Once again, there is no indication that either the AFOSI or the Air Force IG is even aware of these matters involving Mrs. Dickerson which impact her husband’s clearance, let alone that a complete and thorough review of such allegations has taken place.

We are hereby providing you with additional information so that you may commence an investigation immediately. These allegations involve extremely serious matters, including but not limited to several leaks of sensitive information by Mrs. Dickerson to a foreign country and direct threats that were made by Mrs. Dickerson against Ms. Edmonds and her family. These allegations are also considered serious by the Senate Judiciary Committee. See, Letter from Sen. Patrick J. Leahy and Sen. Charles E. Grassley to Hon. John Ashcroft (August 13, 2002), attached hereto.2/ We also incorporate herein all of the allegations contained in the attached August 13th letter from Senators Leahy and Grassley to Attorney General Ashcroft.

Mrs. Dickerson was a contract monitor at the FBI Washington Field Office translations department and was granted a security clearance by the FBI to work as contract monitor to perform translation services for the FBI commencing in October or November, 2001. However, Mrs. Dickerson had past and ongoing associations with one or more subject(s) or target(s) of an ongoing FBI investigation and failed to disclose those associations to the FBI. In June, 2002, the FBI confirmed in an unclassified briefing to the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee that Mrs. Dickerson did, in fact, have undisclosed contacts with a foreign official who was the subject or target of an FBI investigation.3/

Ms. Edmonds believes there is credible evidence that both Mrs. Dickerson and her husband, Major Dickerson, had ongoing improper and undisclosed contacts with one or more foreign officials. Such improper contacts are not limited to whatever contacts the Dickersons may have with the American-Turkish Council. Notably, the public record already reflects that the Dickersons maintained frequent associations with foreign nationals (aside from whatever relationship with the American-Turkish Council they may have). We believe that those associations and the frequency of such associations were not reported by the Dickersons as required by FBI/DOJ and DOD requirements, and that these associations are such that the Dickersons would be vulnerable to coercion, exploitation, or pressure from a foreign government.

Moreover, the Dickersons made statements to Ms. Edmonds and others that reflect that the Dickersons have a substantial financial interest in a foreign country that makes both of them vulnerable to foreign influence.

In addition, Mrs. Dickerson was assigned to translate information obtained from FBI wire-taps concerning one or more subject(s) or target(s) of an investigation, but she had past and ongoing improper and undisclosed contacts with the subject(s) or target(s). Mrs. Dickerson is suspected of leaking information to one or more targets of an FBI investigation to which she was assigned to perform translation services.

Mrs. Dickerson also improperly instructed Ms. Edmonds and another employee at the FBI not to listen and translate certain FBI wire-taps because Mrs. Dickerson claimed that she knew the subject(s) and was confident that there would be nothing important to translate concerning those subject(s) or their conversations.

When Ms. Edmonds refused to go along with Mrs. Dickerson’s instruction and, after Ms. Edmonds reported Mrs. Dickerson’s conduct to FBI management, Mrs. Dickerson threatened the lives and safety of Mrs. Edmonds and her family members, who were citizens of, and resided in, a foreign country. Ms. Edmonds alleges that Mrs. Dickerson made such threats because Ms. Edmonds refused to go along with Mrs. Dickerson’s scheme to obstruct justice and because Ms. Edmonds reported her concerns about Mrs. Dickerson’s wrongdoing to FBI management.

As a result of misconduct by Mrs. Dickerson, numerous translations were not properly conducted, and/or intentionally not conducted, which threatened intelligence and law enforcement investigations related to September 11th and other ongoing counter-terrorist, counter-intelligence and law enforcement investigations. As a result of Mrs. Dickerson’s misconduct, extremely sensitive and material information was deliberately withheld from FBI translations.

In addition, FBI work order documents concerning translations related to September 11th investigations were falsified and contained forgeries of Ms. Edmonds’ name and/or initials.

By letter dated May 8, 2002, Ms. Edmonds, through counsel, notified Attorney General John Ashcroft and FBI Director Robert S. Mueller, III, that as a direct result of the FBI’s failure to address or correct the serious misconduct and security breaches that were reported by Ms. Edmonds, the safety and security of Ms. Edmonds and her family has been jeopardized and that a foreign country has targeted Ms. Edmonds’ sister to be interrogated “and taken/arrested by force.” Ms. Edmonds’ counsel’s letter of May 8, 2002 to the Attorney General and FBI Director also provided them with a copy of the arrest warrant served by the foreign country at the residence of Ms. Edmonds’ sister in the foreign country together with a copy of the English translation of the arrest warrant.4/

We believe that the warrant that was issued to Ms. Edmonds’ sister in the foreign country is the direct result of improper contacts between the Dickersons and a foreign country, and was a result of the threats that were made by Mrs. Dickerson when she threatened the lives and safety of Mrs. Edmonds and her family members, who were citizens of, and resided in, that same foreign country. In addition, we believe that the threats made by Mrs. Dickerson, and the issuance of the arrest warrant, were the result of improper and undisclosed contacts by Mrs. Dickerson and Major Dickerson with a foreign official. Such acts taken by Mrs. Dickerson (and other statements made and conduct by both Dickersons) would indicate a preference for a foreign country over the United States which would also make Major Dickerson prone to provide information or make decisions that are harmful to the interests of the United States, and such acts reflect a level of personal conduct and outside activities that raise a security concern that may be disqualifying. Our concern in this regard is heightened by the fact that it is alleged that Mrs. Dickerson has maintained dual citizenship with a foreign country and has continued to possess a foreign passport from that same country as well as by the statements to others by both Major and Mrs. Dickerson that they have financial or business interests in that foreign country.

It is inconceivable how the Department of Defense could tolerate permitting one of its military officers to have access to classified information under such circumstances, especially when that officer’s spouse is alleged to have: (1) threatened another person employed as a translator for the FBI on counter-terrorism and counter-intelligence cases; (2) committed other misconduct and serious security violations while employed by the FBI (such as having unreported contacts with one or more foreign officials while performing translation services for the FBI regarding conversations involving the same foreign officials); and (3) to make matters worse, carried out those threats by leaking information about the FBI translator to a foreign country (or agents thereof) so retaliation could be carried out against members of the FBI translator’s family who resided in that foreign country. Moreover, as outlined above, there is more than sufficient information to require a security investigation of Major Dickerson based on foreign influence, foreign preference, personal conduct, security violations, and outside activities. See, e.g., Adjudicative Desk Reference (ADR), Adjudicative Guidelines, Version 2.2, pp. 3-13 (July, 2001) (Guidelines B, C, E, K, and L).5/

Additionally, we do not believe that Major Dickerson could be considered an “innocent spouse” and there is ample evidence that he was involved in (and/or had knowledge of and failed to report) many of the activities of his wife that comprise her acts of misconduct. Moreover, in light of the serious allegations raised against Mrs. Dickerson, and the alleged involvement of Major Dickerson in his wife’s nefarious activities with, or on behalf of, foreign interests, Major Dickerson is vulnerable to coercion, exploitation, or pressure from foreign interests.

We do not believe that these matters could have been thoroughly or completely reviewed in the short time that AFOSI and the Air Force IG devoted to reviewing Ms. Edmonds’ letter of August 7th. After reviewing this matter further we believe that you will agree that Ms. Edmonds’ allegations of Personnel Security violations are very serious and that they warrant further investigation by your office. For all of the above reasons we hereby request that you re-open this matter and that the DOD OIG thoroughly investigate these matters.

Please direct all correspondence or communications about these matters to this office. If you, or anyone at the Department of Defense or Inspector General’s offices, has any questions regarding this matter please feel free to contact me. Thank you in advance for your attention to this matter.

Sincerely,
David K. Colapinto
Attorney for Ms. Edmonds

Enclosure
cc: Senator Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman
Senate Judiciary Committee
Senator Charles E. Grassley, Senior Member
Senate Judiciary Committee

End of letter.

JON RAPPOPORT www.nomorefakenews.com